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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, New York City identified improving energy efficiency in existing
buildings as one of the vital options for reducing the city’s greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.1 The City’s conclusion is consistent with many studies identifying energy
efficiency, and particularly energy efficiency in residential and commercial buildings, as
a major piece of any effort to mitigate global climate change. These studies show that
energy efficiency investments are an essential low or no-cost option for reducing
emissions, but that there are an array of barriers to initiation of energy efficiency projects.
One of the most significant of these barriers, especially in residential and commercial
building projects, is the lack of available capital. This is due in part to owners’ reluctance
or inability to fund expensive up-front costs of improvements, in part to lack of
information, and in part to lack of ability to attract capital because of collateral issues.
New York City’s experience following through on its initial policy analysis is instructive.
When it recently attempted to put in place a requirement that buildings undertake
efficiency improvements that would pay for themselves within five years, there was
widespread protest over lack of available financing.2
This paper will address how a federal program to aggregate and potentially
guarantee loans made to finance energy efficiency projects can be leveraged to promote
best practices on the state and local level for opening up energy efficiency projects to
external financing. There are a number of existing financing tools that have started to
solve the problem of providing access to capital for efficiency projects, but the programs
are all relatively small and have had limited market penetration. One essential, but not
1
2

See City of New York, PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater New York (2007).
See Infra Section I.D.

-1-

exclusive, solution will be to create a federal entity, based on existing green bank
proposals, that has the authority and funding to provide credit support for efficiency
financing and that can help create a secondary market for efficiency backed financial
products.
The paper proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the role of energy efficiency in
addressing global climate change and the impediments to greater energy efficiency
investment. Part II examines existing policy options and financing tools and reviews
some of their limitations. Part III looks at existing green bank legislation and suggests
modifications to those proposals, as well as additional federal policies that should be
considered.

I. RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE EFFICIENCY CHALLENGE
Improving energy efficiency throughout the economy is one of the most important
policy imperatives for addressing global climate change, and one of the most elusive.
Because energy efficiency presents a significant opportunity for cost savings through
energy savings, it has the potential to offset higher cost actions to lower GHG emissions,
reducing the overall cost of climate change mitigation. Despite that, there are persistent
barriers to greater action on energy efficiency, blocking progress on many of the most
effective short and medium-term actions for addressing climate change. Improving
energy efficiency in residential and commercial buildings provides a useful example of
the challenges associated with improving energy efficiency and a sector where a package
of government policies may be particularly effective for removing the barriers to greater
efficiency.

-2-

A. Energy Efficiency and Climate Change
The importance of energy efficiency measures in mitigating climate change stems
from the central role of energy in the climate problem. The International Energy
Agency’s (IEA) projections suggest that energy demand will continue to grow
significantly in the next twenty years, with overall demand growing by 45% between
2006 and 2030.3 Energy use, however, is the primary driver of GHG emissions,
accounting for 83% of all emissions in 2006.4 Increased energy use is thus a primary
driver of emissions growth, with emissions from energy use projected to increase by 45%
in 2030 from 2006 levels.5
Climate change mitigation requires a transformation of both the type of energy
produced and the way energy is consumed. Improving energy productivity—both
shrinking energy
Figure 1: Energy Related CO2 Reductions By Source in IEA
Policy Scenarios

demand and
increasing the
amount of energy

used per dollar of
economic output—
is repeatedly
Source: World Energy Outlook 2008, 447.

identified as a

3

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 78 (2008).
International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions From Fuel Combustion Highlights (2009 Edition)
8 (2008).
5
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 382 (2008).
4
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primary source of potential energy-related emissions reductions.6 For example, the IEA’s
projections of energy use changes necessary to address climate change show that energy
efficiency accounts for 63% of avoided energy-related GHG emissions in scenarios that
stabilizes carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere at 550 parts per million (ppm)
and even greater end-use efficiency gains are required for a scenario that stabilizes CO2
concentrations at 450ppm (See Figure 1).7
Separate analyses of what efforts will be required to address climate change also
suggest that energy efficiency will play a critical role. One analysis has broken down the
necessary emissions reductions to stabilize GHG concentrations into wedges, with each
wedge representing one Gigaton of avoided GHG emissions per year by 2050.8 Of the
seven wedges discussed in 2004, four could come from energy efficiency.9 Another
analysis based on the initial wedges paper suggests that building energy efficiency alone
will need to account for three wedges—twenty percent of all avoided emissions.10
How to improve energy efficiency, however, represents an enduring energy policy
conundrum. It has long been known that many energy efficiency measures will pay for
themselves over a reasonable time, however many of these savings are ignored or
unrealized. The potential for cost effective energy savings are now particularly important
given the potential expense of many alternatives for mitigating climate change. The
consulting firm McKinsey & Co. has produced a now well-known cost curve for reducing
6

For this reason, energy efficiency is referred to as the “fifth fuel” and avoided energy
consumption from energy efficiency measures are referred to as “negawatts.” The Elusive
Negawatt, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 2008.
7
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 445-447 (2008).
8
S. Pacala & R. Socolow, “Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50
Years with Current Technologies,” 305 SCIENCE 968 (2004).
9
Id. at 969.
10
Climate Progress, http://climateprogress.org (Mar. 26, 2009, 17:40 EST).
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GHG emissions, and, in turn, addressing climate change (reproduced in Figure 2). Bars
below the X-axis of the McKinsey cost curve represent activities that have positive netpresent value (NPV), meaning that over time these investments produce a positive
economic return, assuming a seven percent discount rate.11 The shaded bars in the cost
curve each represent
Figure 2: McKinsey & Co. NPV Energy Efficiency Analysis
a different energy
efficiency measure,
from improvements
to consumer
electronics to
adoption of
combined power and
heating technologies.
The essential lesson
to be taken from the
NPV Energy Efficiency savings appear in blue.
Source: Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy, xxii.

McKinsey cost curve
is that energy

efficiency improvements represent the majority of cost-effective means to reducing GHG
emissions and that significant economic savings are being ignored.
The McKinsey cost curve highlights another fundamental aspect of the energy
efficiency challenge—the diverse array off efficiency opportunities for end-users.
11

HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET ATL., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY IIIV (2009) available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/electricpowernaturalgas/downloads/us_energy_efficiency
_full_report.pdf.
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Setting aside available gains from improved transportation efficiency or gains from
improved electrical transmission efficiency, McKinsey’s analysis suggests that there are
significant efficiency gains that can be realized across the residential, industrial, and
commercial sectors.12 Efficiency gains can come from improved electronic equipment
efficiency, industrial process improvement, waste heat management, improved major
appliance efficiency, and a wide array of building efficiency retrofits.13

B. Opportunities in Residential and Commercial Building End Use Efficiency
Of the potential energy efficiency gains, improvements in existing buildings are
particularly notable. First, in the residential and commercial sectors, gains can be
achieved with relatively little technological innovation. Second, building efficiency
represents the largest category of potential gains in terms of potential emissions
reductions. As discussed below in Part I.C., efficiency gains in buildings are also the
beset by some of the most difficult barriers to action on energy efficiency.

1. Types of Efficiency Opportunities
Potential energy efficiency improvements in the residential sector include a
variety of home insulation upgrades, structural improvements such as sealing air leaks,
lighting upgrades, and heating and cooling system upgrades.14 Other residential sector
gains can come from improved efficiency in various household appliances and improved

12

Id. at 10.
Id. at 15 (note Exhibit 7 in the McKinsey report, which presents each of the NPV stationary
end-use efficiency measures in terms of both how much energy can be saved and the net annual
savings from adoption of those measures).
14
McKinsey & Co., 34.
13
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efficiency in consumer electronics.15 Residential insulation, windows, and building shell
modifications are particularly important as improvements in these features of residential
buildings have significant potential to reduce overall residential energy use.16 Similarly,
commercial building energy efficiency opportunities are clustered around building shell
improvements and HVAC systems.17
These types of energy efficiency measures for residential and commercial
buildings are almost entirely based on existing technologies that generally have positive
NPVs.18 While these technologies are almost all cost effective and that their adoption
represents one of the most significant sources of potential efficiency gains, significant
barriers stand between recognition of their importance and wide scale deployment. These
barriers are common to many energy efficiency opportunities, but are particularly notable
when considering residential and commercial building efficiency.

2. Scale of Efficiency Opportunities in the Commercial and Residential Building Sectors
Of the various options for improving energy efficiency, measures to improve
residential and commercial buildings represent a significant portion of available energy
efficiency gains. Overall, the residential and commercial sectors comprise sixty percent
of potential energy efficiency gains in 2020.19 Based on McKinsey’s analysis, efficiency
improvements to existing commercial and residential buildings account for sixty percent
of those efficiency gains—combined, forty percent of the potential efficiency gains will
15

Id. at 46-47.
Philipine de T’Serclaes, Financing Energy Efficient Homes: Existing Policy Responses to
Financial Barriers 11 (IEA Information Paper, 2007).
17
McKinsey & Co, 56.
18
See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, PROMOTING ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS:
CASE STUDIES IN THE RESIDENTIAL SECTOR 29-31 (2008).
19
McKinsey & Co, 12.
16
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come from buildings.20 While other analyses of energy efficiency opportunities do not
break down the overall energy efficiency potential in the same way as the McKinsey
study, a separate study of existing energy efficiency investments also shows that
investments in building efficiency (across sectors) accounts for thirty percent of the
current energy efficiency market.21
Not surprisingly given the size of the emissions abatement opportunity, residential
and business efficiency measures represent a significant market. As noted above,
building efficiency improvements make up thirty percent of the $300 billion efficiency
investment market—$90 billion.22 Based on the potential for the energy efficiency
market, which could grow to $700 billion overall by 2030, the building efficiency market
could eventually represent a $210 billion market.

C. Barriers to Energy Efficiency Uptake
The availability of cost effective efficiency measures, and the importance of those
measures for addressing both climate change and growing costs of energy consumption,
suggests that uptake of energy efficiency measures is hindered by a number of barriers.23
Barriers can be divided into two categories—market barriers and financial barriers.24
Market failures include lack of information and split incentives. Related to market
failures, there are a number of behavioral failures that may also be relevant.25 Financial

20

Id.
Karen Ehrhardt-Martinez & John A. “Skip” Laitner, The Size of the U.S. Energy Efficiency
Market: Generating a More Complete Picture 13 (ACEEE Report No. E083, 2008).
22
Id. at 14.
23
The Elusive Negawatt, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 2008.
24
Promoting Energy Efficiency Investments, 34, 37.
25
Kenneth Gillingham et al., Energy Efficiency Economics and Policy 15 (RFF Discussion Paper
DP 09-13, 2009).
21
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barriers include high up-front costs and limited financing options. Notably, many of
these barriers are exacerbated by the fragmented nature of energy efficiency
opportunities.
Market failures lead to significant distortions in the market for energy efficiency
improvements. A critical market failure, particularly for large-scale investments like
building efficiency upgrades is lack of information. Information failures come in the
form of difficult to understand technical information, insufficient information about the
long-term operating costs of an investment, and lack of standardized assessment of
investment opportunities.26 Energy efficiency opportunities may be complex and
difficult to understand, they may span a range of different parts of a building—from
windows to heating systems to different types of insulation for various parts of a house or
building, and they may be difficult for an individual home or building owner to
aggregate.27 Market failures also include a significant principle-agent issue where people
who will benefit from efficiency measures are not necessarily the people making
decisions about whether to make efficiency investments.28 This principle-agent problem
often leaves the person paying for electricity not in a position to make a decision about
whether to invest in a given efficiency opportunity, and reduces incentives for building
owners that do not have to pay energy costs from absorbing higher up-front costs for an
investment that will provide no return.29
Market failures interact with behavioral preferences that inhibit rational energy

26

Promoting Energy Efficiency Investments, 35.
Id.
28
Trevor Hauser, The Economics of Energy Efficiency in Buildings 4 (Peterson Institute for
International Economics Policy Brief PB09-17, 2009).
29
Gillingham et al., 12.
27
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efficiency investment decisions. Specifically, faced with lack of information, consumers
will display loss aversion and status-quo bias, leading them to shy away from investments
they do not understand.30 Consumers have also been shown to assign irrational discount
rates to energy efficiency investments, expecting fifty to seventy-five percent returns on
those investments—a payback of one to two years.31
Financial failures affect both home and building owners and financial institutions
that may be interested in providing capital for energy efficiency investments. For home
and building owners, the initial capital costs of an energy efficiency improvement—even
one that pays for itself over a few years—may make that improvement impossible to
afford without outside financing.32 For both owners and financial institutions,
uncertainty over calculating energy savings makes evaluation of individual efficiency
projects difficult. Similarly, lack of a widely agreed upon measurement and verification
standard makes systematic evaluation of projects difficult for financial institutions.33
Project dispersion also creates a significant financing failure. Because individual energy
efficiency projects are relatively small and diverse in commercial financing terms, an
individual project may be particularly uncertain and may be too small to attract
investors.34
Efforts to increase investment in energy efficiency in buildings will thus depend
on both overcoming information failures and creating a framework for increasing access
to financing to overcome the cost structure of efficiency investments. Local and national
30

Id. at 16.
McKinsey & Co., 25.
32
Promoting Energy Efficiency Investments, 37.
33
Id. Note, there is an international standard for measurement and verification used by many
Energy Service Companies, but has not been widely adopted outside of ESCOs.
34
Id. at 39-40.
31
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efforts to increase energy efficiency investments show that efforts to address both types
of barriers must come in conjunction to effectively increase efficiency investments.

D. Financing Case Study: New York as an Example
New York City’s efforts to promote energy efficiency investments provide a
useful case study for the relevance of barriers to energy efficiency measures and the need
for wider policy initiatives. In 2007, New York City launched PlaNYC 2030, a
comprehensive sustainability plan designed, in part, to address the city’s GHG
emissions.35 One element of PlaNYC is an initiative to revise the city’s building codes
for existing buildings. In April 2009, Mayor Bloomberg unveiled a package of laws that
would have required existing buildings in the city larger than 50,000 square feet to
undergo regular energy efficiency audits—comprehensive certifications of energy
efficiency opportunities—and to undertake any measures that were identified to pay for
themselves in five years.36 In December 2009, the Mayor and City Council dropped the
investment requirement amid significant criticism that there would be insufficient
financing available for such projects.37
The experience in New York is a useful example of both the kinds of
comprehensive policy measures that might be needed to promote greater energy
efficiency investment and the persistence of the barriers to those investments. The New
York City law provided both a means for overcoming information failures, through the
efficiency audit, and a mandate that will generate a market. The absence, however, of a
35

See City of New York, PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater New York (2007).
Andrew Revkin, City Plans to Make Older Buildings Refit to Save Energy, N.Y. Times, Apr.
22, 2009, at A19.
37
Mireya Navarro, Bloomberg Drops an Effort to Cut Building Energy Use, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
2009, at A1.
36
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well-defined market for energy efficiency financing undermined the viability of the entire
legislative package.

II. POLICIES FOR FINANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY: AVAILABLE OPTIONS AND
CRITICAL GAPS
A. Policy Options for Improving End-Use Energy Efficiency
There are an array of policy options available for spurring energy efficiency, not
all of which are directly related to increasing access to financing. These options are
worth considering because while this paper focuses on improving access to financing,
most studies recognize that no single policy will solve the energy efficiency challenge.38
Indeed, many of these policies may be complementary to or will help reinforce policies
aimed at improving efficiency financing. Additionally, these policy options could work
hand-in-hand with larger policy initiatives, including efforts to put a price on carbon.
While a broader price signal alone will probably not work because of the scattered nature
of potential efficiency gains, it will make many of those gains more readily apparent.39
The first type of policy is to set standards and codes for energy efficiency. This
approach is particularly relevant for non-building related efficiency measures, such as
appliance standards.40 Codes can also play an important role in ensuring energy efficient
designs in new construction by setting minimum efficiency standards for new homes and
building. Codes may also be important creating a framework for energy efficiency
improvements in existing buildings, along the lines of the aborted efforts in New York

38

McKinsey & Co., 91-92.
Id. at 97.
40
WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (WBSCD), ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS: TRANSFORMING THE MARKET 31 (2009); see also McKinsey & Co.,
94.
39
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City. Codes are limited, however in that they cannot be implemented on a national scale,
and thus leave the possibility of missed opportunities, and as seen in New York, in the
case of existing buildings, they do not necessarily solve the up-front capital issues.
Therefore, while codes may be an important part of creating a market for efficiency
investments, they cannot operate in a vacuum.
The second type of program is direct or indirect government funding. Direct
government funding may help finance demonstration projects or spur a market, and will
be very important for government-owned facilities, but probably cannot fill the gap
needed to finance energy efficiency on an optimal scale. Government subsidies and tax
breaks are potentially relevant—current tax breaks for efficiency investments are
relatively low and could be increased, and additional subsidies through grant programs
could provide the seed for state or local level financing initiatives.41 At the state level,
indirect funding can come through a systems benefit charge assessed by utilities. A
systems benefit charge is added to utility bills and is used to finance energy efficiency
projects, typically for low income homes.42
A third category of policy options may revolve around addressing information
issues. Government can play a major role in addressing information problems by setting
up education programs such as labeling regimes and mandating wider use of information

41

See Promoting Energy Efficiency Investments, 88-89. A version of federal grant funding for
financing initiatives is already in place and is discussed further infra. See Department of Energy,
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program, available at
http://www.eecbg.energy.gov/about/competitive_grants.html.
42
Matthew Brown, Models for Administering Ratepayer-Funded Energy Efficiency Programs
(Alliance to Save Energy State Energy Efficiency Policy Briefs #4, 2009) available at
http://ase.org/uploaded_files/6099/EE_Admin_Structures.pdf.
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programs.43 Local and state governments can play an important role in building
efficiency by adding requirements for energy audits upon sale of a property or other steps
to ensure homeowners or purchasers have verified information about energy efficiency
opportunities. Here again, New York’s codes provide a good example of a policy that
may eventually reinforce financing efforts. By mandating energy efficiency audits on a
regular basis—a part of the bill that was preserved—information about potential savings
will at least now be readily accessible.44
Finally, governments can intervene to promote access to financing for energy
efficiency projects. Through rules and regulations and through financing programs,
governments may be able to promote the flow of financing to efficiency projects. This is
the policy option addressed in the following sections of this paper.

B. Existing Programs for Financing Energy Efficiency Improvements
There are a number of existing alternatives for financing energy efficiency
investments. These programs will provide the foundation for any expansion of financing
for energy efficiency and will show the relevant gaps that a policy initiative needs to fill.
Current financing options are divided between private and public financing, with some
overlap between the two categories.

1. Private Sector Financing
Two areas of private financing are worth considering in examining energy
efficiency financing. Direct private financing shows the limits of current financing
schemes. Energy Service Company financing provides a good model for how third-party
43
44

WBCSD, 31.
Navarro, Bloomberg Drops an Effort to Cut Building Energy Use. See also WBCSD, 31.
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financing might work, but also shows the limits of the current third-party private
financing market.
The most basic form of private financing is direct financing for energy efficiency
retrofits by the building owner. Direct end-user financing involves the consumer paying
for the costs of energy efficiency retrofits, offset only by available subsidies and tax
incentives.45 As discussed above, direct financing is limited by most of the information
problems associated with energy efficiency and by access to capital. Home and building
owners’ unreasonably high discount rates in assessing energy efficiency projects and lack
of necessary information to guide investment decisions are especially prominent when
considering direct financing. More importantly, limited by access to capital will continue
to hinder direct financing. However, for incremental and emergency replacements, direct
financing will continue to be a relevant piece of the efficiency financing world.
An alternative form of private financing is third party financing independent of
government intervention or support. Energy performance contracting by Energy Service
Companies (ESCO) is a well established, if small, form of energy efficiency financing.46
ESCOs operate by developing and overseeing energy efficiency projects, bearing the upfront costs while receiving a payback over five to ten years.47 ESCOs have developed an
effective system of evaluating and measuring potential efficiency gains and financing the
necessary improvements while sharing the savings with the client. The market for
ESCOs, however, remains quite small. In 2006, revenues from the ESCO industry
45

McKinsey & Co., 100.
For an overview of the ESCO industry, see generally Nicole Hopper et al., A Survey of the U.S.
ESCO Industry: Market Growth and Development from 2000 to 2006 Ernest Orlando Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory LBNL-62679, 2007).
47
Edward Vine, An International Survey of the Energy Service Company (ESCO) Industry, 33
ENERGY POLICY 691 (2005).
46
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reached $3.6 billion with $2.5 billion of that coming from efficiency investments.48 The
ESCO industry’s energy efficiency activities thus represent approximately two percent of
energy efficiency investments in commercial and residential buildings.49
One issue for ESCOs is that the current market is dominated by contracting with
government and institutional building owners, and is much smaller in the residential and
commercial sectors. The municipal and state government, university, college, schools,
and hospital market accounts for fifty-eight percent of the ESCO market, with federal
government and public housing contracting accounting for another twenty-four percent of
the market (a combined eighty-two percent of the ESCO market).50 This is in part due to
issues with reluctance relating to encumbering private properties with additional loans, as
well as limited access to capital for non-public sector contracts.51

2. Public Sector Financing Programs
Alternatives to private financing come from financing based on public programs
or legislation and complete publically managed financing programs. Examples of public
financing include private financing based on a public mandate, such as energy efficient
mortgages and utility based financing, and direct public financing programs such
municipal bond programs to provide financing to home and building owners.
Energy efficiency mortgages (EEM) are one example of a hybrid financing
arrangement where a federal mandate has created a market for private energy efficiency
financing. EEMs are based in part on a Federal Housing Administration (FHA) program
48

Hopper et al., v.
Based on author’s calculations using market size numbers from Ehrhardt-Martinez & Laitner
and ESCO market data from Hopper et al.
50
Hopper et al., 13.
51
Vine, 693-94.
49
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established in 1992. The FHA, an agency charged with increasing home ownership by
insuring mortgages, will underwrite mortgages that include funds to undertake energy
efficiency upgrades based on a home energy rating system evaluation.52 The Department
of Veteran Affairs and both government-sponsored enterprises (GSE), Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, also provide EEM products. EEMs provide a good example of adjusting a
current financing program to account for energy efficiency gains when combined with
information programs (the energy efficiency audits required for the EEM). The program,
however, is limited by the requirement for an audit and by the overall size of the
program.53
A second example of hybrid financing comes from utility financed energy
efficiency improvements. Utility financed energy efficiency programs involve a utility
company providing funds to a customer to finance energy efficiency investments with
repayment coming through either through a loan which is paid back as a line-item on the
utility bill or through an additional tariff.54 These programs are a mix of independent
utility activity and regulator-authorized initiatives, with on-bill loans not requiring
regulatory approval but some tariff programs requiring sign-off.55 These programs, like
most other efficiency financing programs, require an energy efficiency audit. Based on

52

Promoting Energy Efficiency Investments, 265; see also Steve Baden et al., Hurdling Financial
Barriers to Low Energy Buildings: Experiences from the USA and Europe on Financial
Incentives and Monetizing Building Energy Savings in Private Investment Decisions 8-12
(Florida Solar Energy Center FSEC-PF-396-06, 2006).
53
EEMs are limited to 5% of the FHA portfolio. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Boosts Energy-Efficient Mortgages,
RESEARCH WORKS, Nov. 2008, at 4.
54
Matthew Brown, Paying For Energy Upgrades Through Utility Bills 1 (Alliance to Save
Energy State Energy Efficiency Policy Briefs #3, 2009) available at
http://ase.org/uploaded_files/5476/On-Bill%20Loans%20-%20Final.pdf.
55
Id. at 2.

- 17 -

the audit, the utility will finance and often service improvements with the costs being
repaid over time through utility bills.56 Recourse for failure of payment can be the same
as with any failure to pay a utility bill—disconnection of the utility service.57
While these programs provide a potentially attractive solution to some of the
financing issues discussed in the next section, they have not been widely adopted. One
issue is that in many cases they require regulatory approval. The programs also require
updating billing systems and create potential losses from loan defaults and
administration. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the programs stray from a utility’s
core competency, requiring a utility to act as a financing entity.58
A final example of public financing is municipal financing for efficiency
investments. The best developed model for this kind of program is municipal Property
Assessed Clean Energy Bonds (PACE Bonds) in which a town or city issues a bond to
raise capital for energy efficiency projects, and home or building owners receive
financing for efficiency improvements, paid off as a special assessment to the building’s
property taxes.59 These bonds have received significant attention and have been adopted
in California as well as by towns in New York.60 To establish a PACE Bond program,
typically a state needs to pass enabling legislation; a municipality needs to create a PACE
56

Id.
Id. at 3.
58
Id. at 10-11.
59
Daniel Kammen, Financing Energy Efficiency with Taxes, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, March 27,
2009, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=financing-energyefficiency-with-taxes.
60
Id. PACE Bonds are a program that has received some attention in conjunction with the 2009
economic stimulus funds. PACE Bond programs are eligible for some DOE grants and were the
subject of an administration white paper on energy efficiency funding. See Council on
Environmental Quality, Recovery Through Retrofit (Middle Class Task Force Report, 2009)
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Recovery_Through_Retrofit_Final_Report.pdf.
57
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district; and the district then needs to issue a PACE master bond. Once a PACE Bond is
created, building owners can conduct an efficiency audit and apply for loans to pay for
efficiency improvements. Loans are funded through the bond issue and are paid back
through regular assessments on property tax bills.61
PACE Bonds provide one of the most attractive models for financing efficiency
improvements by creating a well recognized financing structure and providing a system
for bringing in outside capital. The programs, however, are still quite new and face a
variety of issues, particularly with commercial buildings over security for the loans and
sources for initial seed funding for the bonds.

C. Issues that Need to Be Addressed for Financing Energy Efficiency
While there is a wide array of programs that have the potential to improve access
to financing for energy efficiency improvements, there are four macro-level impediments
to improving the flow of capital to these financing opportunities. First, for many of the
financing arrangements, security for the loans remains a challenging issue. Second, there
is a lack of institutional expertise in many financial institutions, leaving these types of
financing arrangements without a natural constituency. Third, the size and scale of these
opportunities creates an issue where aggregation is necessary to attract capital. Finally,
while there are some existing measurement and verification standards, standardization of
loans is still a problem.
The first financing issue that a policy will need to address is security from default
risk for financing arrangements. A critical issue with efficiency loans is that because
61
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there is no asset to secure the loan, there are limited recourses for failure to pay.62 For
private third party financing through ESCOs or banks, this reduces the attractiveness of
many small residential or commercial projects and raises the cost of lending for those
projects.63 The issue of security also arises for building owners, especially in the
commercial sector. Owners may not want to encumber a property with additional debt as
this may reduce their ability to sell the property freely.64 Finally, even where there are
streamlined means to secure a loan—through on bill financing or PACE Bonds—there
remains issues over what priority efficiency loans would be given and whether new liens
would adversely affect existing loans.65
The second financing issue is lack of institutional expertise in efficiency
financing. While ESCOs certainly have the relevant expertise to oversee financing, they
remain a small part of the overall efficiency market. Other financial institutions that
might be expected to fill the remaining gap, however, suffer from a lack of relevant
personnel with necessary expertise.66 This leads to a lack of awareness of financing
opportunities, limited experience with project evaluation, and resistance to working with
unfamiliar financial products that fall below a certain scale requirement.67
The third issue to overcome for energy efficiency financing is scale and
aggregation. As noted above, individual energy efficiency projects are relatively small.
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The cost of retrofitting a house, for example, might be $20,000. While this might amount
to a significant outlay for a homeowner, it is a small financing opportunity for a bank or
even an ESCO.68 The small size of efficiency projects suggest that unless the projects
can be aggregated in a way that will draw institutional investment, they will pose greater
costs than will be recouped through the loan terms.69
The final issue is one of standardization. The range of financing opportunities for
energy efficiency investments makes it difficult to standardize loan terms and evaluation
of projects.70 This problem, especially when combined with the scale problem, makes
institutional investing particularly difficult, as there are little in the way of models for
standardized loan products and arrangements.71 While the existence of energy efficiency
mortgages suggests that there are ways to create some standardization, the link to the
more established, and larger, loan product probably explains how mortgages are different
than separate efficiency loans.
A set of policies to promote significant expansion of efficiency investment will
therefore need to address each of these issues. As with efficiency policy in general, the
range of issues blocking expanded financing suggests that a single policy initiative alone
will not solve the problem of expanding access to and scale of efficiency financing.

III. THE ROLE FOR FEDERAL POLICY: ADJUST AND IMPLEMENT EXISTING GREEN
BANK PROPOSALS TO SPEED FLOW OF CAPITAL TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECTS &
PROMOTE STATE AND LOCAL POLICIES THAT CREATE FINANCING OPPORTUNITIES
Given the array of issues blocking access to financing and limiting the scale of the
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finance market, a policy to expand efficiency financing needs to combe actions at the
local, state, and national levels. The solution proposed in this paper seeks to pair efforts
at the national level to increase available capital with actions to open up more markets by
pushing local and state governments to adopt best practices that enable investments in
energy efficiency. This combination has the potential to alleviate the challenge that many
programs that would benefit from greater capital flows are also dependent on legislative
or regulatory changes below the federal level that might otherwise not happen or be
completely disconnected from an increase in capital flows.
The core of this policy proposal builds off existing federal financing proposals
contained in pending green bank legislation. Most reviews of financing challenges
suggest that loan guarantees and other credit enhancements will be necessary to promote
greater flow of capital to energy efficiency projects, in part to make up for the difficulties
in identifying collateral for energy efficiency loans.72 A green bank can help to address
that problem by providing support for loans and by spurring greater investment into
energy efficiency savings-backed financial assets, so that contracts or securities that do
not have collateral issues will also benefit from greater access to capital.
Separate legislation creating financing agencies has been passed in the House of
Representatives and is pending in the Senate, and features of both bills should be
combined.73 The proposals should look to take the best features of existing government
sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae as wells as fully government funded and
controlled financial institutions such as the Export-Import bank. In its final form, the
green bank should be able to function as a largely autonomous entity that has the power
72
73

See, e.g., McKinsey & Co., 60.
See S. 1462, 111th Cong. §§ 101-109 (2009) and H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 182-191 (2009).

- 22 -

to both directly support loans and aggregate efficiency investments and issue securities
based on those investments.

A. Overview of the Green Bank Concept
1. Green Bank Proposals
Green bank proposals have gained significant traction in the past year. In
conjunction with legislation to address energy policy and climate change, there has been
a significant advocacy effort to establish and fund a green bank that would provide
financial support for clean energy technology, including renewable energy generation and
energy efficiency measures.74 There are a number of models for federal financing
entities, which provide useful insight into design features for a green bank. The Senate
and the House have each taken up a measure creating a “Clean Energy Deployment
Administration” (CEDA) to act as a green bank.75 The most effective model for a green
bank will probably come from selecting specific provisions from both proposals, while
also expanding certain features that may improve access to energy efficiency financing.

2. Potential Green Bank Models
While there are a wide variety of federal financing programs, from direct loans to
indirect support through presumed federal guarantees. Two financing models are
particularly relevant for a green bank. The first is the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank, a
wholly owned federal corporation, which provides financial support to companies
74
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exporting goods out of the United States. The second is the government-sponsored entity
model for home and student loan financing. Both models involve institutions that operate
outside of the federal bureaucracy but that rely on various levels of government support
to support their financing activities.
The Ex-Im Bank was established in 1934 and has the mission of providing credit
support for U.S. exports.76 The bank operates as an independent entity, separate from any
departments or agencies. Early in its development, the Ex-Im Bank provided both direct
and indirect support for exports through direct loans and indirect credit support.
Currently, the bank focuses primarily on credit support through loan guarantees and loan
insurance.77 The Ex-Im Bank is a potentially useful model as a financing entity that
operates outside of existing agencies but with the full support of the federal government.
It plays an analogous role to a green bank by providing credit support for specific
projects that the Bank’s staff has established standards for assessing.78 The Bank does
not, however, aggregate and securitize loan products for a secondary market.
The home and student loan corporations backed by explicit and implicit federal
guarantees provide the second potential model. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and until
recently Sallie Mae, are all Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) that operate as
privately funded corporations with government charters.79 Before the current financial
crisis, each was explicitly independent of direct government support, though a
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government guarantee of debt issued by these corporations was widely assumed.80 The
GSEs operate on a different model than the Ex-Im Bank with executives and staff
appointed and overseen by the board of directors, and the primary financial product being
securities based on loan aggregation.81 While the GSEs have encountered severe
financial difficulties in the past two years, they have succeeded in creating a broad
secondary market for home loans.82 The process behind this success has eased access to
home and student financing and created generally accepted loan standards for a
significant subset of home mortgages and student loans.

3. Design Issues
The critical design considerations that these models raise are placement within
and relationship with the federal government and role in the market for the financial
products created or supported by the financial institutions. A critical difference between
the Ex-Im Bank and the GSEs the explicit nature of the institutions’ financial support.
Because the Ex-Im Bank is a government corporation with explicit government credit, its
full loan portfolio must be accounted for in the federal budget. The GSEs on the other
hand, operated independently of the federal government before being placed in
receivership with little more than an implicit loan guarantee. Because of this, their
portfolios of loans were not accounted for, and the eventual government support was
essentially an unanticipated budgetary expense. These two models suggest that federal
financing entities can play a significant role in expanding a market for financial products
80
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or financial support, but the role within the federal government will determine how
effectively the risk exposure of the entities is accounted for.

B. Existing Green Back Proposals
The House and Senate are either considering or have passed green bank
legislation that will create a federal financing entity for clean energy projects. The
mission of the proposed institution would be to finance both energy efficiency projects
and renewable energy generation projects. The two models are broadly similar, but differ
in two critical ways.
The Senate is currently considering the American Clean Energy Leadership Act
(ACELA), a broad energy bill that creates a Clean Energy Deployment Administration
within the Department of Energy.83 The agency will operate independently of other parts
of DOE, but under the oversight of the Secretary. The Administrator would be appointed
Table 1: ACELA vs. ACES – Key Provisions
Provision
Institution type

S. 1462 – ACELA
§105 – Agency within the
Department of Energy.

H.R. 2454 – ACES
§186 – Wholly owned
independent corporation.

Administrator

§105(b) – Senate confirmed
appointment, compensated at
Senior Executive Service rate.

Staff

§105(e) – Limits on number of
people paid outside of normal
governments civil service paygrades.
§107 - $10 billion capitalization
through transfer from Treasury.

§186(b) – Senate confirmed
appointment, compensated at
market rates for similar
positions.
§186(e) – General power for
Administrator to hire, no wage
rate language.

Funding

Credit Enhancement

83

§106 – Indirect support both
through aggregation of financial
products and support of debt
obligations.

S. 1462, 111th Cong. § 105 (2009).
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§184 - $7.5 billion
capitalization through bond
issue.
§188 – Indirect support for
financing variety of transactions
through credit enhancement.

and Senate Confirmed and would be paid on the Senior Executive Service Salary Scale.84
The Senate version of CEDA would be responsible for both direct financing of clean
energy projects and indirect financing through loan support and credit enhancement.85
Notably, the Senate CEDA is explicitly empowered to develop and issue securities based
on aggregated projects, or to provide credit support for such securities.86 The Senate
CEDA is funded through a $10 billion transfer from the Treasury.87
The House version of CEDA, incorporated into the American Clean Energy And
Security Act of 2009 (ACES) is structured slightly differently. (See Table 1 for a
comparison of relevant provisions) Instead of being housed within an existing agency,
the House CEDA is an independent corporation similar to the Ex-Im Bank.88 While the
Administrator would be Senate confirmed, he or she, along with the CEDA staff, would
not be subject to federal pay scales.89 The House CEDA would also be in a role to
provide both direct and indirect credit support for a variety of clean energy projects, but
is not explicitly authorized to aggregate loans and issue securities based on those loans.90
A $7.5 billion bond issue would fund the House CEDA.91

C. Proposed Modifications to Existing Green Bank Proposals
The existing legislation, if enacted, would go a long way toward providing the
necessary financing structure for energy efficiency investments. Both would identify
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worthwhile funding opportunities, both would establish standards for the types of projects
that would receive direct and indirect credit support, and both would create a significant
pool of capital for those projects. Both proposals, however, should draw on features of
the other chamber’s legislation to strengthen the final concept. Additionally, the bank
should be established with an eye toward its long-term role in an energy efficiency
market.
The first issue in reconciling the House and Senate CEDA bills is the status and
placement of the bank. Of the two proposals, the House model of an independent
government corporation is more consistent with the other successful financing models.
Perhaps the biggest advantage for an autonomous agency is the ability to pay at
prevailing market rates, as opposed to government salary scales. At least one analysis of
green bank proposals has concluded that this will draw a wider range of finance
professionals.92 While there is a good argument for keeping CEDA closely aligned with
DOE, and, in turn, drawing on DOE’s existing experience with energy project funding,
the process of developing underwriting standards and potentially securitizing energy
efficiency loans will likely demand specific financial skill sets that may not be as easily
drawn under the constraints of the federal civil service pay system. For this reason, the
House provisions on institution type and organization should be kept.
The second, and related issue is the power of the bank to aggregate and securitize
energy efficient loans. Here, the Senate provisions explicitly empowering CEDA to issue
securities based on aggregated efficiency financing provides a stronger basis for an array
of energy efficiency financing. While the House definitions of credit support are useful
92
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and may help provide credit enhancement for certain types of energy efficiency project—
particularly PACE Bonds—the lack of explicit language about aggregation probably
limits the role CEDA could play in expanding the energy efficiency financing market. A
critical role for CEDA will be to develop standards for efficiency loans and to spur a
secondary markets for those loans. The ability to aggregate, similar to that of the GSEs,
is a well-established model for accomplishing these goals.
The final design consideration relates less to underlying legislation and more to
the eventual internal organization of the CEDA. As presently designed, CEDA will
provide financing for a variety of clean energy technologies, not just energy efficiency
investments. While it arguably makes sense for practical reasons to keep clean energy
financing activities in one institution, if CEDA does play a central role in creating a
secondary market for efficiency backed securities, it is possible that the efficiency and
clean energy financing functions will begin to look very different. If CEDA successfully
creates and efficiency security market, its role in that market will probably shift from
providing direct and indirect credit enhancement to a role analogous to the GSEs play in
the secondary market for home mortgages and student loans. For this reason, one
possible outcome would be for the efficiency financing functions of CEDA to be spun off
into a self-financing GSE reliant exclusively on private capital. While this would raise a
number of issues relating to oversight of such an organization, creation of a thriving
private market for efficiency finance should be a goal for CEDA. As such, in setting up
CEDA, it may be worth creating a separate division that focuses exclusively on loan
aggregation and underwriting, as this could serve as the eventual seed for a new entity.
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D. Cost of a Green Bank
The final issue for consideration in designing CEDA is how, and for how much, it
is funded. The Senate and House legislation provide CEDA with $7.5 to 10 billion of
financing through eventual bond issues. This pool of money is not dedicated to
efficiency financing alone, but spans all technologies financed by CEDA. A critical
question is whether this will provide an adequate fund for commercial and residential
efficiency finance.
As discussed above, the overall market for commercial and residential energy
efficiency was $90 billion in 2004 with the potential to grow to $210 billion in 2030.93
While CEDA would probably not need to provide credit support for the entire energy
efficiency market, these numbers provide useful upper limits for how much financing
might be required within the efficiency market. CEDA will almost certainly be required
to operate under the budgeting rules of the Federal Credit Reform Act, which requires
that an agency providing credit support budget the net present value of the expected
default on the loans. Default rates for other federal financing programs, such as the GSEs
range from three to five percent, meaning that at any given time, a credit supplying
federal agency’s budget should reflect that percentage of its loan portfolio.94 Assuming
CEDA has a default rate at the upper end of the federal program default rate, this
suggests that in 2004 CEDA would have had a budget of $4.5 billion for a $90 billion
efficiency financing portfolio. In 2030, this budget would need to grow to approximately
$10 billion for a $210 billion loan portfolio.
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Based on the existing financing proposals for CEDA, the $7.5 to $10 billion
budget should be sufficient to providing financing in the efficiency market. This
however, depends on the internal allocation within CEDA for efficiency efforts versus
other clean energy technologies. The founders of the Coalition for A Green Bank have
called for a prioritization of efficiency projects because of their immediate job creation
potential.95 The founders suggest CEDA’s enabling legislation add an explicit provision
establishing a jobs-creation mission.96 Such a proposal might be limiting in the long run,
where best technology financing might be a better goal. Instead, enabling legislation
could be strengthened by perhaps segregating the initial funding into a fund aimed at
immediate deployment, which would likely favor efficiency financing.97

E. Additional Federal Policies: Expanding Incentives for Energy Efficiency
Financing Options
While the creation of a green bank is an essential step for increasing access to
financing for energy efficiency projects, it is almost certainly not a sufficient solution.
As noted above, the array of market barriers and policy options goes beyond simple lack
of access to capital and requires a number of policy tools. Even in considering the
financing challenge, policies and programs to create loan and finance programs may need
to be initiated at the state or local level. Creation of a green bank, therefore, cannot take
place in a vacuum.
One option to expand financing opportunities would be to pair the launch of
95
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CEDA with an effort to use existing and future federal funding for energy efficiency to
promote best practices on the state and local levels. One possibility would be for the
federal government to expand funding available for energy or efficiency projects that are
subject to competitive grant making. The current Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Block Grant Program could be expanded to provide grants for state and local programs
that put in place a policies that facilitate the aggregation of energy efficiency investments.
Another option would be to divide CEDA funding into a competitive loan pool that
provides preferred lending terms to programs that will help create underwriting standards
and that can be expanded nationally. The overall goal of this policy would be to create
enough different categories of investments that can be aggregated and sold to financing
institutions, which would, in turn, be prompted to buy up such contracts based on
financing incentives created by the green bank.

F. Potential Issues With an Effort to Increase Efficiency Finance
There are two primary issues with a green bank policy initiative. First, there is
legitimate concern about creating another federal financing program that would expose
the government to default risk. Second, the link between a new financing initiative and
creation of projects to finance remains tenuous. While neither of these concerns is
insurmountable, they both should be addressing when considering the legislation and
subsequent regulations for a green bank, and in considering other federal policies to
promote energy efficiency investment.
The first of these concerns comes in the wake of a financial crisis that was
partially caused by failures in the secondary market for mortgages. While the crisis was
based in part on mortgages outside the purview of the GSEs, the crisis still left the GSEs
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in dire financial condition and the federal government in a position of having to take the
two home mortgage corporations into receivership. The concern over financial condition
and exposure is probably best addressed in the initial organization design of CEDA.
While CEDA should not be created as an agency within DOE, its status as a wholly
federally owned corporation and its budgeting requirements under the Federal Credit
Reform Act should allow for effective accounting of the bank’s risk exposure.
The second concern is more difficult to address because the barriers to energy
efficiency investment have been very persistent. While access to funding and, in turn,
creation of widely accepted underwriting standards should serve to help break down
some of the financial barriers to energy efficiency investment, other policies will also be
necessary to generate financing opportunities. Linking the creation of CEDA to such
policies will be one step, but may not be sufficient. This is an issue that will require
continued study and analysis, as well as recognition that the task of financing energy
efficiency will not be complete when CEDA is launched.

CONCLUSION
Securing capital for residential and commercial energy efficiency projects
remains a primary impediment to greater investment in these sectors. Despite widespread
recognition that investment in these areas is a critical element to any effort to address
global warming, the current financing options have not proved adequate for the task of
funding efficiency projects. If current proposals for the CEDA are adjusted in ways that
creates an independent green bank with the power to aggregate and securitize efficiency
projects, the resulting institution has the potential to alleviate this problem by both
providing access to secured capital and by helping standardize financing in a way that
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will draw increased private investment. This initiative, however, should not be the only
effort to address financing, and instead should be implemented holistically with other
efforts to promote state and local financing projects.
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